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ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE: WHO NEEDS IT IF THEY HAVE A 
JUSTIFIABLE USE OF FORCE DEFENSE? 
 
Thomas J. Bourguignon 
 
No. OP-14-0096 
Montana Supreme Court 
 
State of Montana, Petitioner v. Montana Ninth Judicial District Court, 
Teton County, the Hon. Robert Olson, District Judge, Respondent 
 
Oral Argument: Monday, April 28, 2014, at 10:00 a.m. in the Strand 
Union Building, Ballroom A on the campus of Montana State University, 
Bozeman, Montana 
 
I. QUESTION PRESENTED 
 
 Can a criminal defendant offer evidence of justifiable use of force by 
offering a statement made out of court in lieu of testimony—in other 
words, does Montana’s justifiable use of force statute of necessity nullify 
some of the rules of evidence? 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 The facts1 are these: Martin Vincent Lau shot and killed Donald 
Kline at the residence that Kline shared with his girlfriend, Susan Pfeifer. 
There were no other witnesses to the shooting. Lau called 9–1–1 
afterward and admitted to the killing. Lau indicated to the police that he 
shot Kline in self-defense.  
 The State charged Lau with felony deliberate homicide. Lau properly 
provided notice that he would raise the defense of justifiable use of force 
(“JUOF”) and indicated that he was a possible witness at trial. 
 Four months after the incident, Lau voluntarily read to police officers 
a typed statement (the “Statement”), prepared with the assistance of his 
attorney, in which Lau asserted all of the elements necessary for a JUOF 
defense. The Statement also included allegations about the violent 
character of the victim—but without any allegations that Lau relied on 
that violent character when he acted in self-defense. 
 In the Statement, Lau claimed that Kline had committed about fifteen 
violent acts against Pfeiffer and her property. Lau alleged that he shot 
                                         
1
 The facts presented here are drawn from two documents: (1) Atty. Gen.’s Pet. for a Writ of 
Supervisory Control, Mont. v. Mont. Ninth Jud. Dist. Ct., Teton Co., the Hon. Robert Olson, Dist. 
Judge at **2–5 (Mont. Feb. 11, 2014) (No. OP-14-0096); and (2) Response of Def. Martin Vincent 
Lau to Atty. Gen.’s Pet. for Writ of Supervisory Control, Mont. v. Mont. Ninth Jud. Dist. Ct., Teton 
Co., the Hon. Robert Olson, Dist. Judge at **6–9 (Mont. Mar. 20, 2014) (No. OP-14-0096). 
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Kline after being punched by Kline. Lau further alleged that, while 
brandishing his 9mm Carbine, he had warned Kline at least three times 
not to approach him and had fired a warning shot into the ground before 
firing a single shot that struck Kline. 
 Prior to trial, the State filed motions in limine seeking (1) to prohibit 
Lau from offering the Statement as evidence in lieu of taking the stand 
and (2) to require Lau to lay foundation before offering evidence of the 
victim’s violent character. Lau argued that this would unconstitutionally 
require him to testify. 
 The District Court issued an Amended Order (the “Order”) before 
trial, ruling in Lau’s favor and permitting the use of the Statement in lieu 
of testimony and permitting Lau to offer evidence of Kline’s violent 
character without needing to testify to lay foundation. The Order also 
ruled that Lau could allow the Statement to infer, without testifying, that 
he had in fact relied on his knowledge of Kline’s violent character. 
 Prior to trial, the State filed a Writ of Supervisory Control with the 
Montana Supreme Court, asking the Court to prevent the “gross 
injustice” of allowing the trial to occur pursuant to the Order. 
 
III. ARGUMENTS FROM THE PARTIES’ BRIEFS 
 
The State of Montana’s argument on appeal:  
 
1. The Order permits Lau to offer the Statement, which is 
inadmissible hearsay, as evidence. The Statement is offered in order to 
“prove the truth of the matter asserted,” thus it is hearsay.2 The District 
Court was wrong as a matter of law to conclude that the Statement is 
offered to show “state of mind” because the Statement includes 
statements of “memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or 
believed.”3 According to the State, the jury should not be required to 
assess the reliability of the Statement.  
 
2. The Order permits Lau to offer evidence of the victim’s character 
for violence without laying foundation to make it admissible. There are 
three elements for admission of evidence of victim’s prior violent 
conduct: (1) self-defense must be at issue; (2) the defendant must lay 
foundation for the evidence with admissible testimony; and (3) the 
defendant must present evidence that he relied upon that evidence in 
defending himself. 4 The State concedes the first issue but argues that the 
second and third are not met; in fact, the State argues that Lau never 
alleged the third element, reliance, at all. The State argues that the Order 
was incorrect to permit the jury to infer the third element; according to 
                                         
2
 Mont. R. Evid. 801(c). 
3
 Mont. R. Evid. 803(3). 
4
 Mont. R. Evid. 405; State v. Daniels, 265 P.3d 623, 633 (Mont. 2011). 
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the State, this goes against statutory law5 and prior caselaw6 and 
abdicates the judge’s duty to rule on admissibility. 
 
3. The Order misinterprets the state and federal constitutional rights 
to remain silent7 and to put on a defense.8 The State argues, in brief, that 
whatever evidence a defendant chooses to offer in his defense must be 
admissible; further, there is no violation of a defendant’s constitutional 
rights if the defendant feels he has no choice but to testify in order to 
fully present his defense.  
 
Defendant Lau’s argument on appeal: 
 
Lau’s arguments are each somewhat less nuanced and may be 
enumerated in brief: (1) by arguing that Lau must testify in order to 
present his evidence, the State seeks to strip Lau of his constitutional 
right not to testify and his constitutional right to put on his case; (2) the 
State has the burden, under Montana law,9 of proving that Lau was not 
justified in using force; (3) Lau’s conduct at the time of the killing falls 
squarely within the JUOF provision; (4) Lau has cooperated with law 
enforcement; (5) the district court was right to rule that the Statement is 
not hearsay because it is not offered to prove the truth of the matter; and, 
perhaps most important, (6) the rules of evidence cannot apply in their 
normal sense to the JUOF statute because that would result in an 
impermissible shifting of the burden of proof onto a criminal defendant. 
 
Amicus MTACDL’s argument on appeal: 
 
MTACDL further refined that final argument of Lau’s. According to 
MTACDL, as long as a defendant puts on any evidence of JUOF, the 
State must then prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the use of force 
was not justified.10 The amicus cited two Montana cases to support its 
position.11 
                                         
5
 Mont. Code Ann. § 45–2–103(3) (2013) (the “existence of a mental state may be inferred” by facts 
and circumstances; however, the State argues, the jury cannot be asked to infer Lau’s reliance on his 
knowledge of Kline’s violent character from the fact of Lau’s knowledge alone). 
6
 According to the State, the Order would “nullify” the State’s jurisprudence on Mont. R. Evid. 405; 
Daniels, 265 P.3d at 633 (the fact that the State bears the burden of proof “does not eliminate the 
need [for a defendant] to satisfy foundational requirements for the admissibility of evidence pursuant 
to the Rules of Evidence”). 
7
 U.S. Const. amend V; Mont. Const. art. II, § 25. 
8
 U.S. Const. amend VI; Mont. Const. art. II, § 24. 
9
 Mont. Code Ann. § 46–16–131. 
10
 Mont. Code Ann. § 46–16–131. 
11
 Daniels, 265 P.3d 623 (requires criminal defendant to lay foundation for admitting evidence of 
justifiable use of force—but the amicus asserts that this evidentiary holding is limited to the facts in 
Daniels); State v. Rogers, 306 P.3d 348 (Mont. 2013) (defendant has to testify and lay foundation 
before cross-examining victim about the victim’s character for violent acts. The Court in Rogers 
declines to review the constitutional issue). 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
 
 It is difficult to say why Lau has chosen in this case not to testify. 
After all, the facts of the case appear to place him squarely within the 
JUOF defense: there is evidence that the victim had a history of violence, 
that the victim showed up, angry and unstable, and Lau warned him not 
to approach several times and fired a warning shot into the ground before 
shooting the victim. It is even somewhat surprising, given how strong 
Lau’s alleged JUOF defense appears on its face, that the State has chosen 
to bring this prosecution. Perhaps Lau and his counsel fear that his 
version of events would fall apart during cross-examination; perhaps the 
State believes that it could reveal inconsistencies or errors in Lau’s 
version of events memorialized in the Statement. 
 Nonetheless, although Lau’s defense on the merits appears to be 
strong, his constitutional and evidentiary arguments appear rather weak. 
Lau’s argument that the JUOF statute should cancel out the operation of 
select rules of evidence is a stretch, to put it mildly. The State correctly 
points to the policy reasons behind the rule against hearsay: to ensure 
that only reliable evidence, subject to cross-examination, is presented 
before a jury. Lau’s constitutional argument is equally infirm: yes, Lau 
has a right not to testify, but the right not to testify does not come with a 
corresponding right to offer evidence that would only be admissible if he 
testifies. If you choose not to testify, you may have to leave that evidence 
behind. 
 Finally, there is little reason to anticipate that this case will not fall 
under the facts of Daniels and Rogers, both of which required the 
defendant to lay foundation before presenting evidence. This author 
would be most surprised if the Court follows Lau’s invitation to hold that 
a criminal defendant may present a case comprised entirely of 
inadmissible evidence simply because he prefers not to testify. 
 
Lower Court: Teton County Cause No. DC 12-009; Honorable Robert 
Olson, District Court Judge of the Ninth Judicial District, Teton County. 
 
Attorney for Petitioner: Jonathan M. Krauss, Assistant Attorney General, 
State of Montana. 
 
Respondent: Honorable Robert Olson, District Court Judge of the Ninth 
Judicial District, Teton County, pro se. 
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Attorney for Defendant Martin Vincent Lau: Kenneth R. Olson, Olson 
Law Office, P.C., Great Falls, Montana. 
 
Attorney for Amicus: Jason T. Holden, Faure Holden Attorneys at Law, 
P.C., Great Falls, Montana; President of Montana Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers (“MTACDL”).
